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TEACHING AND DOING: THE ROLE OF LAW
SCHOOL CLINICS IN ENHANCING ACCESS TO
JUSTICE
Stephen Wizner*
Jane Aiken**
"Legal education plays an important role in socializing the next
generation of lawyers, judges, and public policymakers. As
gatekeepers to the profession, law schools have a unique
opportunity and obligation to make access to justice a more central
social priority."'
Deborah Rhode has provided a compelling critique of law schools
for their failure to embrace a justice mission and inculcate in students
the professional value of providing pro bono service to the poor. Her
analysis assumes the basic belief that we as a society must strive to
make legal assistance available to the poor in both criminal and civil
cases, and that law schools have been complicit in the pervasive denial
to the poor of access to justice.2
The primary obligation to provide legal services to the poor resides
with the government, and to a lesser extent, with the legal profession,
not with law schools. Nevertheless, law schools do have some
obligation to contribute to the solution of the crisis in access to justice,
and it seems obvious that the obligation is best accomplished by law
school clinics assisting low-income individuals and communities that
are underserved or have particular difficulty obtaining lawyers
because of the nature of their legal problems.'
Clinical legal education has been focusing on legal services for the
underserved and on the justice mission of law schools for years.
Those who built clinics a little more than three decades ago and those
who funded them saw, like Rhode, a large, unmet need for legal
* William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
** William M. Van Cleve Professor of Law, Washington University of St. Louis
School of Law.
1. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 193 (2004).
2. Id. at 19.
3. This obligation is expressed throughout Sec. L. Educ. & Admissions to the
Bar, ABA. Legal Education and Professional Develooment-An Educational
Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:
Narrowing the Gap (1992).
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representation for the poor in both criminal and civil cases.4 They
also observed the lack of practical involvement of the law schools in
the rights revolution sweeping the courts and communities of
America.5 One of the primary reasons for having a clinic was to
engage a law school more directly in providing that representation.6
Much has happened in clinical education since those early days, but
little has improved in the provision of legal services to the poor. This
Essay revisits the issue of the role that law school clinics can, and
should play, in expanding access to justice. To do so we need to cast a
critical eye on what we do, who we are, what we have become, and
whether we need to rediscover, redefine, and reimagine our
professional role as law school clinical teachers.
Thirty years ago a hardy band of public defenders and legal services
attorneys stormed the academy.7 Many of the lawyers who started
building and teaching in clinics at that time were lawyers who had
worked in legal aid and public defender programs and in civil rights
and other public interest advocacy programs.8 It is not surprising,
therefore, that clinics began at many law schools primarily as
programs to enable law students to provide free legal services to the
poor or to bring important impact litigation, under the supervision of
practicing attorneys. An important by-product of that service was an
increased awareness on the part of law students of the needs of the
poor and oppressed. Clinics were about skills training, providing
service, influencing policy, and developing future legal aid and civil
rights lawyers. Some of us felt like kids in a candy shop; a public
interest law firm funded by a law school with ready workers providing
important client services.
4. See Douglas A. Blaze, Dgjd Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of
Clinical Education, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 939 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Robert C. Cumbow. Educatine the 21st Centurv Lawver. 32 Idaho L.
Rev. 407 (1996): Anita Weinberg & Carol Harding. Interdisciplinary Teachin' and
Collaboration in Higzher Education: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 14 Wash. U.
J.L. & Pol'v 15 (2004).
6. See generally Gary Bellow, On Talkinz Tougzh to Each Other: Comments on
Condlin. 33 J. Legal Educ. 619 (1983): Robert J. Condlin. Clinical Education in the
Seventies: An Anpraisal of the Decade. 33 J. Legal Educ. 604 (1983).
7. In 1959. the Ford Foundation founded the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association ("NLADA"). which established a National Council on Law Clinics. Ford
Found. Grantees and the Pursuit of Justice, available at
http://www.fordfound.org/vublications/recent articles/docs/lawrantees.odf (last
visited Oct. 17, 2004). In 1968, the Ford Foundation gave $12 million over ten years
to incoroorate clinical education as Dart of the curriculum of law schools. J.P. "Sandy"
Ogilvy, History of Clinical Legal Education, at httn://www.aals.org/nlt2004/onilvv.odf
(last visited Oct. 17, 2004). The Council on Legal Education for Professional
Responsibilitv ("CLEPR") was founded in 1968 with Ford monev. Id. From 1969-
1973 CLEPR provided over 100 grants to law schools for clinical education. Id.
8. For a history of legal services from the viewpoint of a clinician, see Louise G.
Trubek, U.S. Legal Education and Legal Services for the Indigent: A Historical and
Personal Perspective, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 381 (1994).
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The development of law school clinics did not come about without
resistance and internal conflict. From the outset tensions emerged
between the public service goals of the first generation of clinical
teachers and their funders, on the one hand, and the academic values
of law school faculties on the other.' The faculties, to the extent they
were not openly hostile to the introduction of experiential learning
into the curriculum, as many were, were more concerned with the
educational value of clinical programs than with the newly hired
supervising attorneys' legal services and social justice motivations.
Clinicians were a different breed from their law professor
counterparts. They were often housed in different spaces, not allowed
to participate in faculty governance, and offered no job security.
Indeed, many, if not most, clinicians had to raise funds to ensure their
own job continuation.10 Funding was scarce for these programs and
law schools struggled to find soft money to fund their clinical
programs. Inevitably, the effort to secure funding created conflicts
within the clinical community. During the Reagan Administration,
Attorney General Edward Meese, proposed that federal funding for
legal services be diverted to law schools as a way of reducing or
eliminating what was viewed as the social activism and left-wing
agendas of some federally-funded legal services programs and
back-up centers." Many law school clinicians joined their legal
services colleagues in opposing this move, arguing that law school
clinical programs as teaching programs were, by design, inefficient and
should not be taking poor people's legal services funds away from the
more efficient legal services programs."l Those of us who opposed
taking legal services money away from legal services programs in
order to support law school clinics argued that law schools should be
financing clinical programs, especially because so much of what goes
on in clinics involves teaching. 3 In order to use clients' cases for
teaching, we had to take smaller caseloads and spend more time
examining, preparing, reflecting, and in other ways using clients' cases
as teaching "texts."
9. See generally Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary
Reflections on Clinical Education As Methodology, in Clinical Education for the Law
Student 374 (Council on Legal Educ. Prof'l Dev. ed., 1973).
10. This is still the case in many law schools. See Peter Joy, ABA Site Visits:
Everything You Ever Wanted to Know, at http://www.cleaweb.org/aba/index.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2004) (identifying status issues of clinicians as one of the areas to
evaluate when conductine an ABA site insoection): see also Daphne Eviatar, Clinical
Anxiety, Rebellious Lawyers Are Shaking Up Law School, Legal Aff., Nov./Dec.,
2002, at 37.
11. For an insightful analysis of the impact of funding cuts and restrictions on legal
services, see Raymond H. Brescia et al., Who's in Charge, Anyway? A Proposal for
Community-Based Legal Services, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 831 (1998).
12. See Trubek, supra note 8, at 383, 388.
13. Id. at 386-87.
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Nevertheless, some law schools did apply for and receive federal
legal services dollars to support their clinical programs." Gary
Bellow's decision to apply for and accept a substantial amount of
federal legal services funding to support the Harvard clinical program
was, and continues to be, controversial.15 However, in all fairness to
Bellow, who was a true visionary and major force in both legal
services and clinical legal education, the Legal Services Center that he
founded in the Jamaica Plain neighborhood of Boston has been a
major provider of legal services to low-income clients, and has given
opportunities to hundreds of law students to engage in supervised
legal services work for low-income clients.16
The controversy surrounding the Harvard program concerns not
only the acceptance of federal legal services funding in the beginning,
but the design of the program itself.1 7 Supervising attorneys in the
Harvard program have never traveled the path from "supervising
attorney" to "clinical professor." Their full-time job is supervising
students handling cases for clients. They are not expected to teach
classes, write articles, or participate in any of the institutional
activities engaged in by members of the faculty. The faculty-Gary
Bellow until his untimely death, and Charles Ogletree, who directs the
Harvard Criminal Justice Institute-do all of the "teaching." Harvard
Law School, a school with more than 1500 J.D. students, today has
only one clinical faculty member, Charles Ogletree.18 But it also has
many more supervising attorneys in its various clinical programs. 9
Harvard Law School provides a lot of legal services to low-income
clients, far more than any other law school." Harvard has chosen, for
whatever reason, to construct its clinical program as a legal services
program, and all of the supervision is performed by staff attorneys
(who have been given the quasi-faculty title of "clinical instructors"). 21
It has created as efficient a legal services delivery program as possible
using law students to do much of the work.22 In so doing, Harvard has
14. See, e.g., Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1969); Blaze,
supra note 4, at 952-53, 959 (recounting the history of law clinics at the University of
Tennessee); Trubek, supra note 8, at 386 (explaining the Legal Services Corporation's
special program to fund law clinic programs).
15. See Harvard Law Sch., The Hale and Dorr Legal Services: Center History, at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/lsc/history.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2004) [hereinafter Hale and Dorr].
16. Id.
17. The controversv is not unioue to Harvard. See Report of the Committee on the
Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. Legal Educ. 508, 512-13 (1992).
18. Harvard Law Sch., Harvard's Clinical Faculty, at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/clinical/clinics.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2004)
[hereinafter Harvard's Clinical Faculty].
19. Id.
20. See Hale and Dorr, supra note 15.
21. Id.
22. See id.
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avoided, or evaded, the educational and political winds that have
swept through most law schools, primarily from the Association of
American Law Schools ("AALS") and the American Bar
Association, which have resulted in the movement of clinical legal
education from an adjunct role outside of the regular curriculum, to
the much more established and accepted role that clinics now play in
legal education.
By having only two clinical faculty members--one since Gary
Bellow died-Harvard is able to hire a large number of staff attorneys
at considerably lower salaries than those paid to members of the law
school faculty.23 Staff attorneys do not function on an academic
calendar, do not receive academic leaves, and do not enjoy the other
perquisites of law professors. 24 They supervise students representing
clients .2  Harvard has embraced the provision of legal services to the
poor as the central focus of its clinical legal education program and
the primary way to meet the law school's obligation to address the
maldistribution of legal services.26
Most clinicians today would not say that they are primarily in the
business of providing legal services to the poor as is done in the
Harvard program.27 Thirty years have aged us. Thirty years have
brought us new challenges, such as being hired through the AALS
"meat market, '28 meeting publication requirements, feeling pressure
(and sometimes a guilty desire?) to teach nonclinical courses. We are
on committees, we go to conferences to talk about our work, we
publish, we over-commit-we try to do it all. Within the clinical
community there are tensions that our increased assimilation into the
traditional law school world has created for us. Our aspiration for
faculty status may have made us develop clinics driven by faculty
interests as much as, or even rather than, community need. The more
integrated into the traditional law school we become, the more these
pressures arise. The fact that we have the possibility of job security
(and good salaries) means that we do not have the steady turn over of
young, energetic lawyers who can be connected to the communities
23. See Harvard's Clinical Faculty, supra note 18.
24. A description of staff attorneys' duties are included in Hale and Dorr, supra
note 15.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a
Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School
Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1879, 1918 (1999); Richard A. Boswell,
Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187,
1188 (1992).
28. See Am. Ass'n of Law Schs. Faculty Recruitment Servs., at
http://www.aals.org/FRS/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2004) (describing the process
by which persons seeking entry-level teaching positions apply through a central hiring
conference overseen by the AALS). This hiring conference is colloquially known as
the "meat market."
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we seek to serve. Our age alone, and the demands of family and
academic life, make retreating from direct client contact enticing. The
nine month academic calendar poses its own challenges: We plan
clinics that allow time to respond to all of these pressures (reduced
case loads, reduced faculty/student ratios, lots of simulation, hiring
fellows or staff attorneys to do the case handling, choosing cases that
allow for writing), not because there is a need in the community.
It seems appropriate to express some skepticism about what we
have come to accept as "progress" in clinical legal education. A
discussion of clinicians on the tenure track (by both clinical and
nonclinical faculty) often leads to a discussion of the problem of
"drift," that is, the problem that over time the person hired to be a
clinician will gradually move away from the clinic in order to teach
nonclinical courses. Perhaps we need to engage in a larger discussion
about whether clinical eaucation, itself, has drifted. In particular, in
our three-decade professional advancement from "supervising
attorney" to "clinical professor," have we not moved too far away
from teaching through doing to teaching about doing? Have we
caused the justice mission of clinical education to take a back seat to
professional advancement? Are we being succeeded by a new breed
of clinicians with limited practice experience and expanded academic
ambitions? Are we beginning to look more like the law professors we
knew in law school than the legal aid attorneys we think of as
comrades? Have we, in our struggle to become accepted as members
of law school faculties, compromised our identities as advocates for
the poor and unprivileged, as fighters for social justice? Have we
sacrificed supervised student representation of disadvantaged clients
in favor of clinical pedagogy-classroom teaching, simulations, skills
training, journal writing, and guided reflection? Have we also
replaced a significant part of it not only with clinical pedagogy, but
also with writing for publication, nonclinical teaching, law school
committee work, and other professorial activities? Are we, and the
students we teach, doing as much as we could--as much as we
should-to help alleviate the shortage of legal services for low-income
clients? These tensions, unless resolved, have the potential of diluting
the already meager contribution that clinical legal education makes to
alleviating the crisis in access to justice.
Deborah Rhode has raised, once again, the challenge for law
schools to do better in socializing law students to make "access to
justice a more central social priority."29 At base, that requires us to
evaluate the efficacy of our teaching methods. As law clinics have
begun to look more like traditional law courses, there has emerged a
genuine debate among clinicians about how law students can best
29. Rhode, supra note 1, at 193.
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learn from experience. 0 It is about whether students can only truly
learn what they need to learn about lawyering through the supervised
representation of real clients, or whether that kind of experiential
learning needs to be prepared for, supplemented, and can even be
replaced by skills training through simulation, and aids to critical
reflection such as journals and classroom instruction.31 In essence, we
are walking a tightrope and constantly having to deal with the tension
between teaching and doing.
When Steve Wizner, co-author of this Essay, was a legal services
lawyer in the 1960s, he had law students working in his neighborhood
legal services office, mostly as volunteers, and a few for credit. Their
role was to assist him and the other lawyers in the program by
performing legal research, memo writing, and fact investigation. His
biggest adjustment when he became a supervising attorney in a law
school clinical program in 1970 was to change his relationship to the
law students with whom he was working. Rather than they helping
him with his cases, he had to learn to hand over responsibility for
representing clients to them, and to provide assistance to them on
their cases. In order to accomplish this redefinition of his role, he had
to learn to teach students how to relate to clients and to handle their
cases, to supervise them as they did so, and to help them learn from
that experience.
Steve found that it was not enough simply to provide students the
opportunity to experience the real world through the representation
of low-income clients. As a clinical teacher he needed to sensitize his
students to what they were seeing, guide them to a deeper
understanding of their clients' lives and their relationship to the social,
economic, and political forces that affected their lives, and help
students develop a critical consciousness imbued with a concern for
social justice.32
As the students learned and became more competent, he soon
realized that having a crew of clinic students enabled him, through
them, to represent more clients and handle more cases than he could
as a legal services lawyer, and to take on complex litigation that he
could not handle well on his own. Nevertheless, he found that he was
spending more time teaching students than he had when he first
started out as a clinical instructor.
Over time, as he gradually transitioned from "supervising attorney"
to "clinical professor," he found himself spending time teaching
classes, writing articles, serving on committees, attending conferences,
and increasingly less time in direct supervision of students
30. See Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This Millennium: The
Third Wave, 7 Clin. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
31. See Boswell, supra note 27.
32. Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 Clin. L. Rev. 327, 338-39 (2001)
(discussing the role that clinics can play in teaching a concern for social justice).
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representing clients. In the beginning he supervised twenty (or more)
students. He spent hours and days accompanying students to courts,
administrative agencies, prisons, mental hospitals, government offices,
and other practice venues, and the rest of the time brainstorming with
students about their cases, reviewing and editing pleadings, motions,
legal memoranda, and correspondence, mooting students to prepare
them for court appearances, and preparing students for negotiations
and trials. While he continues to do all of these things today, he finds
himself supervising fewer students, representing fewer clients,
handling fewer cases, and spending time that he used to devote to
those activities in the classroom teaching clinical and nonclinical
courses, writing, and other "professorial" activities.
Jane Aiken, also a co-author of this Essay, was a community
organizer in Washington, D.C. before entering law school and saw the
law as merely another tool to bring to efforts to serve poor
communities. She began her career in law not as a legal services
attorney, but rather back in D.C. as a clinical teacher working in the
community. The provision of legal services was deeply tied to the
educational mission and the pedagogical method of "learning from
experience." It was in that work that Jane watched her students
become empowered, much like the community members she had
worked with to form tenant unions and shelters in her days as an
organizer.
In her clinical teaching Jane sought not only to provide service but
also to organize and inspire students to work for justice when they left
the academy. In those early days, the clinic responded to whatever
need arose in the community. The need drove case selection, and
everyone (students and faculty alike) was expected to get up to speed
on the law as quickly and efficiently as possible. Class discussions
were all about legal strategy. The students were the staff-bodies to
do the work. Her job as the clinical teacher was to identify the
greatest underserved need in the community, design training materials
to ensure that the students could provide competent representation,
participate in legislative and policy drafting, bring strategic class
actions, and identify ways to leverage the prestige of the university
through her relationships with judges. As the tenure decision loomed,
however, pressures to write and to teach nonclinical courses diverted
Jane's energy, took away from the creativity and comprehensiveness
of the legal services work she was doing, and shifted her focus toward
teaching and writing.
As we reflect on what has happened to us professionally since
becoming law school clinical teachers, we realize that we spend a lot
of time in our working day doing things that we would not do if we
were legal services lawyers assisted by law students. We teach
substantive law and practice. We teach about systems and
institutions. We spend hours with students, individually and in
[Vol. 731004
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groups, in classes, supervisions, and less formal conversations, helping
them understand what they are seeing in the "real world"; helping
them recognize, acknowledge, and deal with their feelings about their
clients and their clients' legal problems; and talking about case
selection, analysis of client problems, ethical issues, and how to deal
with clients and adversaries effectively. We spend time mooting
students in preparation for court appearances, administrative
hearings, negotiations, and other client representational activities; and
reading and editing their written work on behalf of clients. All of
these time-consuming activities are what define us as clinical teachers.
There are many inefficiencies built into the design of most law
school clinics that result in limiting the numbers of clients represented
and cases handled by clinic faculty and students. These include
classes, supervision, skills-training, simulations, journal writing (and
reading), guided reflection, and other explicitly pedagogical activities.
It may well be that the teaching and institutional citizenship
responsibilities of clinical professors (including nonclinical teaching,
committee work, and writing), the educational focus of clinical
courses, and the many other claims on the time of clinical teachers and
clinic students, make it unrealistic to expect law schools to play a
significant role in addressing the access to justice problem. Perhaps
the best contribution that law schools can make is to sensitize students
to social justice issues through limited exposure to actual victims of
social injustice, and to inculcate in students the professional value of
service to the underprivileged. But how much is that an abdication of
our social responsibility? How much is self-deception? Should not
law school clinicians be striking a better balance between teaching and
doing? Do we need to think about returning to the root notion of
experiential learning? Are we overemphasizing learning from
teaching at the expense of learning from doing? Should not the core
of our teaching be the doing, putting students in role representing real
clients under supervision? Should we be de-emphasizing fictional
simulation exercises and other forms of artificial skills training, and
classroom instruction? Do we spend too much time-our time and
our students' time-on pedagogy not directly related to the real cases
we are handling?33
We wonder why we devote time to fictional simulations and skills
training, when the lessons we seek to teach through these methods
might be taught equally as well, and certainly more realistically, by
devoting that time to the preparation and handling of actual cases for
real clients. We wonder whether students and clinical teachers devote
33. See. e.x.. James E. Moliterno. In-House Live-Client Clinical Prozrams: Some
Ethical Issues. 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2377, 2387 (1999). Professor Moliterno asks some
of the same ouestions asked here: "Is there an inherent conflict between the
educational and the service missions of clinics? Can clinicians teach legal practice
and, simultaneously, be the practice about which they teach ... ?" Id. at 2378.
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time to student journals and to engaging in guided reflection about
how students and clients experience their personal interactions, at the
expense of actually representing clients and handling cases. We
wonder whether law school clinics could not increase the provision of
legal services they provide to low-income clients and communities
without impairing, and perhaps even enhancing, students' educational
experience. We wonder whether law school clinics should not
increase students' learning through doing, and decrease the time and
effort they devote to learning about doing.
Unless we design our clinics to immerse students in the delivery of
legal services to clients, we teach them too little about legal services
work, underexpose them to the real world of low-income clients, miss
opportunities to engage students in seeking fundamental change
through class actions, and thus fail to meet the law school's obligation
to make a meaningful contribution to addressing the access to justice
problem.
One solution to this problem might be to return to our roots, to
think of clinical legal education programs primarily as legal services
providers. Providing and facilitating access to justice for unprivileged
and underserved clients and communities would be the primary focus
of both our teaching and our doing. This would require law school
clinicians to re-focus their efforts on the provision of legal assistance
to unprivileged and underserved clients and communities through
supervised law student representation. Everything else that clinicians
did would be seen as a secondary objective, and, to the extent
possible, would support the primary objective. When they employed
simulation, to the extent possible it would be in the form of mooting
students for actual representational events on behalf of real clients.
When clinicians wrote, it would be writing that was intended to
advance the project, that is, to assist students in their representation of
clients, assist teachers in their clinical teaching, explain to the
nonclinical world what clinical programs are doing in order to gain
support for the work, use their unique knowledge gained from
practice to propose and advocate reforms in the law, and analyze the
relationship-and tension-between advocacy for clients and social
policy.
Under this approach, when clinicians teach nonclinical courses, the
courses should relate to and support the clinical teaching. This means
that clinicians should teach Trial Advocacy, Evidence, and
Professional Responsibility, but not Torts or Contracts. When they
engage in activities of institutional citizenship, such as serving on
faculty committees, they should consider them as opportunities for
encouraging their law schools to commit financial and intellectual
resources to addressing the maldistribution of legal services through
support of clinical programs, and teaching, research, and writing
[Vol. 731006
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directed toward the amelioration of the crisis in access to justice.34
When clinicians engage in bar activities, clinicians should encourage
the bar to assist in carrying out the social justice mission of clinical
legal education.
An alternative solution might be to abandon any pretense of the
law school clinics as legal services providers.35 In this view of clinical
legal education, it is not about providing more legal services to
underserved clients or using the academy to bring legal action seeking
systemic change. That is important-but far less important than it was
twenty or thirty years ago. It is not that clinicians are forsaking their
roots as they are transformed into academics. Rather, the goals have
changed since those early days-and maybe these goals have changed
for positive reasons, not because of the pressures to become
"academics." '36 Why should clients serve as guinea pigs for students
who, if permitted to take primary responsibility, may provide inferior
legal services?37 What is the virtue of treating clients as fodder for
voyeuristic analysis? Why require clients to establish new
attorney/client relationships with different students, semester-to-
semester? Does not this semester-to-semester approach hinder the
development of an effective strategy in impact cases? Perhaps clinical
education is just another teaching vehicle. This vehicle relies on doing
as its pedagogical method, but doing can be quite limited and still
allow for the kind of learning that clinicians hope to impart.38 If clinics
take on too many cases, they risk students becoming overwhelmed,
lost, and disinclined to do these cases in their practices later. It may
also reinforce students' cultural stereotypes about the poor that go
unchallenged because of caseload pressures. We may leave our
students with the notion that they are powerless to make change as
lawyers as they encounter, day after day, case after case, poor people
ignored, or mistreated, by the legal system. On the other hand, as we
become more integrated into the law school and more effective as
teachers, we can embrace that role, we can write and reflect more
about issues important to the community.39 We can communicate that
providing legal services to the underserved is important because
clinical courses are on the same footing as nonclinical courses. We
34. See Boswell, supra note 27, at 1192.
35. See Ralph S. Tyler & Robert S. Catz, The Contradictions of Clinical Legal
Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 693, 709 (1980).
36. See Linda F. Smith, Why Clinical Programs Should Embrace Civic
Engagements, Service Learning and Community Based Research, 10 Clin. L. Rev. 723
(2004).
37. But see Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or Chosen Few?: The Impact of
Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 853 (1996).
38. See Barbara Bezdek, Reconstructing a Pedagogy of Responsibility, 43 Hastings
L.J. 1159 (1992).
39. See Frank S. Bloch, Framing the Clinical Experience: Lessons on Turning
Points and the Dynamics of Lawyering, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 989 (1997).
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can encourage participation in clinics in our nonclinical classes.
Indeed, instead of only teaching traditional skills and values courses,
we could strive to teach courses in which we are likely to reach the
least clinically inclined students.
As we look toward the future, how do we choose between these two
very different paths? The key, we believe, is not to choose. We must
resist those pressures that make teaching and doing mutually exclusive
or we will lose the soul of clinical education. It is through doing that
students open themselves to the real learning about social justice. It is
through teaching that we help our students appreciate the broader
lessons about power and privilege, about their role in bringing about
or inhibiting social justice. It is the sense of responsibility that they
feel, the fear, the vulnerability when representing real clients, that
inspires students to strive to be effective lawyers with excellent skills.4"
Unlike in simulations, in real cases things can be unpredictable, things
can go wrong, and those wrongs can have real-life consequences when
the client is a human being, not a fictional party in a simulation.
Unlike second chairing, having direct responsibility for cases means
that students must establish independent relationships with clients,
must think ahead, and must shoulder the responsibility for the choices
they make. We cannot afford to lose those lessons by taking the real
clients out of the mix.41 At the same time, we cannot assume that
those lessons will be learned from that intense experience alone. We
need to be there when our students make that connection, because it
is then that we can help them reflect on the experience and hone their
skills and examine their values. It is a trade-off we should be willing
to tolerate. It is not enough to provide students the experience.42 We
40. See Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of
the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
41. We recognize that not all law school clinics are organized as legal services or
public defender projects, where students provide supervised legal representation to
individual clients. Clinics that do impact, social change, and law reform litigation;
international human rights clinics and some environmental clinics that collaborate
with nongovernmental organizations which set the advocacy agenda; and legislative
advocacy clinics, do not have "clients" in the sense in which we use that term in this
Essay. Nevertheless, the intended beneficiaries of their advocacy do constitute
"client" populations on whose behalf these clinics do their legal work. See Deena R.
Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights
Clinics, 28 Yale J. Int'l L. 505 (2003). These clinics can be an effective way to enhance
access to justice for the poor by employing the legal system on behalf of large
numbers of low-income individuals. The risk of this type of clinic, however, is that it
is lawyer-driven (or nongovernmental organization-driven) rather than client-driven,
and therefore may convey to students the wrong message about the correct
motivation for doing the work, which is to use the legal system to struggle for social
justice for the poor, not to empower lawyers to determine in the abstract what is in
the public interest.
42. We do not mean to deny the value to students of the experience of being
exposed to clients and to what lawyers do to address clients' legal problems.
Certainly students learn from the experience itself, even from simply observing, and
even more from participating, whether assisting lawyers or doing the work themselves
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need to help them reflect on that experience, to learn the larger
lessons. We do not want our students just to learn how to handle a
domestic violence case; we want them to reflect on how the justice
system responds, or fails to respond, to domestic violence. We want
them to understand that being hit is only one of many issues in our
clients' lives. We want them to think about the use of violence as a
means of control. In fact, if we don't encourage them to reflect, we
may reinforce the very structure that has led to the violence. We do
not just want our students to draft effective deposition questions in
their class action. We want them to reflect on how individual acts and
attitudes result in policies, procedures, and behaviors that offend the
Constitution. This kind of guided reflection and supervision takes
skill: teaching skill. It is not what we expect of legal service attorneys.
It is expected of law professors.
If we simply expose our students to injustice without addressing it
explicitly, we are complicit in their desensitization, and fail in carrying
out our responsibilities as teachers. We may even become a part of
the problem because it is not possible to be a neutral observer of
injustice. We want to leave our students with the sense that they can
make change. If we are going to do that, we necessarily will be
handling fewer cases. Steve Wizner says that we need to "nurture
students' capacity for moral indignation at injustice in the world."43
That takes time and it takes skill-not lawyering skill but teaching
skill. And, as Jane Aiken stresses:
If all I can do... is to teach students skills ungrounded in a sense of
justice then at best there is no meaning to my work, and, at worst, I
am contributing to the distress in the world. I am sending more
people into the community armed with legal training but without a
sense of responsibility for others or for the delivery of justice in our
society. 44
Finding the synthesis between teaching and doing is not without
significant challenges.45 We still have to look at ourselves and answer
the question, are we doing this because it is more convenient for us or
because it is effective? In our clinics, are we serving clients or are they
serving us? Have we chosen cases that will maximize our students'
learning? Have we built into our schedules sufficient time to reflect
with each student personally? Have we honed our teaching skills so
under the supervision of lawyers. Our point is that experience alone is not enough to
assure that students learn all that they should learn from the experience, and to
inculcate in them the professional value of public service and the professional
responsibility to assist those who are not able to afford legal representation.
43. Wizner, supra note 32, at 330.
44. Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to "Teach Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 Clin.
L. Rev. 1, 6 n.10 (1997).
45. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on
Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577 (1987).
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as to bring the justice mission into our clinical teaching? Are we
making the best use of our privileged positions in the academy to
challenge practices that the practicing bar is not in a position to do?
Are we filling gaps where public funding has failed clients? Are we
bringing our newfound status as law professors to the decision making
table in public policy? Are we creating scholarship that redefines the
idea of justice? 6 When we look ahead to the next three decades of
clinical legal education, where do we see ourselves going and are we
satisfied with that?
Clinical education today creates opportunities for law students to
recognize the injustices in society and in the legal system, to
appreciate the role they can play in challenging social injustice and in
reforming the legal system, to make society and the legal system more
just, and to inspire them to do just that. If we do that well, clinical
legal education will have an even greater impact on promoting social
justice than if we handle more cases. And to do that, we must all be
both effective teachers and effective doers.
Deborah Rhode has asked us to take a hard look at the law schools'
failure to promote access to justice as a value for their graduates.47
Clinical education has not delivered the magic that would transform
law schools into breeding grounds for lawyers dedicated to justice. As
we look toward the future, a future that forebodes increasing disparity
between rich and poor and diminishing numbers of lawyers
advocating on behalf of the poor and oppressed, access to justice
becomes more necessary but also more elusive. Law schools will not
be the answer to this problem. However, within the law school, it is
the clinics that offer the most promise. We have become more
sophisticated in our understanding of what it takes to produce social
justice practitioners. We have learned that it requires both doing and
teaching, and that the teaching is no less important than the doing.
This is because, just as teaching divorced from doing fails to expose
students to the realities of individual and social injustice in society, so
too, doing without teaching risks training students in the skills of
lawyering without inculcating in them the professional values of public
service and the pursuit of justice for the unprivileged.
The balance between teaching and doing has shifted during the
three decades since the birth of modern clinical education. In many
contemporary law school clinical programs students are representing
fewer clients, and spending more time engaging in forms of clinical
46. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the Justice Mission, 40
Clev. St. L. Rev. 469 (1992); Mark V. Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan
Underground: A Critical Perspective on the Status of Clinical Education, 52 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 272 (1984).
47. Rhode, supra note 1, at 19.
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pedagogy that teach them about the representation of clients.48 To the
extent that this has resulted in a lessening of the clinics' direct
contribution to enhancing access to justice for the poor, there needs to
be a justification beyond that of the increasing academic
professionalization of the clinical professoriate.
While clinicians must maintain the focus of their teaching on the
supervised representation of low-income clients by their students, they
also must recognize that there is more to the project of enhancing
access to justice than simply offering law students the opportunity to
learn lawyering skills by representing low-income clients or
collaborating in impact litigation. In order to increase the number of
law school graduates who embrace a professional responsibility to
assure access to justice for the poor, clinicians must strive to inculcate
in their students an understanding and compassionate concern for the
plight of people living in poverty, and a sense of professional
responsibility for increasing their access to justice.
48. See Stephen F. Befort, Musings on a Clinic Report: A Selective Agenda for
Clinical Legal Education in the 1990s, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1991).
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